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I. INTRODUCTION
As Delmar O'Donnell once knowingly opined over a crackling
campfire, "you ain't no kind of man if you ain't got land."' On February 21,
2005, Bobby Shirley achieved that standing, acquiring a thirty-seven acre
2tract of land in Kershaw County from his parents. Although this property
was landlocked by the property of surrounding owners, there was a dirt road
that ran across a neighbor's property and connected the property to Saxon
Road.3 Mr. Shirley's parents had used this road to access the property from
1985 to 2005,4 and this simple dirt road could be traced back all the way to a
1960 plat . In fact, it was uncontested that Elijah Bennett and his family,
who owned the Shirley property from 1947 to 1969, had used this same road
as their sole access to the property.6 At the time that Mr. Shirley acquired
title to this property, W.H. Bundy, Jr. owned the neighboring property over
7which this road ran.
The relationship between Mr. Bundy and Mr. Shirley started well
enough. Mr. Shirley, with the permission of Mr. Bundy, even erected a gate
at the entrance to the dirt oad in order to prevent the public from dumping
trash on the surrounding property.8 However, an incident in which a logging
truck hired by Mr. Bundy blocked the entrance to the road led to conflict
between the two.9 On September 12, 2005, Mr. Bundy instructed Mr. Shirley
to take down the gate and stop using the road.'0 Mr. Shirley, believing that
he had a right to the use of the road, refused to comply, and Mr. Bundy
responded by filing an action on March 24, 2009, seeking a court declaration
that Mr. Shirley did not have an easement for the use of this road."
1. 0 BROTHER, WHERE ART THOU? (Touchstone Pictures 2000).
2. Bundy v. Shirley, 412 S.C. 292, 297, 772 S.E.2d 163, 166 (2015).
3. Id. at 297-98, 772 S.E.2d at 166.
4. Id. at 298, 772 S.E.2d at 166.
5. Id. at 297, 772 S.E.2d at 166.
6. Id. at 297-98, 772 S.E.2d at 166.
7. Id. at 297, 772 S.E.2d at 166.
8. Id. at 298, 772 S.E.2d at 166.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 298, 772 S.E.2d at 167.
796 [VOL. 68: 795
2
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 68, Iss. 4 [], Art. 11
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol68/iss4/11
PROPERTY LAW
Mr. Shirley asserted that during his combined ownership with his
parents he acquired an easement by prescription for the use of the dirt road.12
Alternatively, Mr. Shirley asserted that the Bennett family acquired an
easement by prescription for the use of the dirt road and that this easement
passed with his property, the dominant estate.'3 The special referee
originally held that Mr. Shirley was entitled to use the property due to a
prescriptive easement, but the Court of Appeals of South Carolina later
reversed this holding.14 Over six years after the original action was filed, on
May 6, 2015, the Supreme Court of South Carolina affirmed the appellate
court's reversal. 5 The Supreme Court of South Carolina held that Mr.
Shirley and his family's use of the road at issue could not ripen into a
prescriptive easement because the use was permissive.16 However, it was the
court's discussion of Mr. Shirley's second argument that sets a dangerous
precedent and likely misstates the general law surrounding prescriptive
easements. Although the court noted that Mr. Shirley may not have
presented the necessary clear and convincing evidence to establish that the
Bennett family acquired a prescriptive easement,'7 the court held that Mr.
Shirley's claim failed because he presented no evidence regarding the
'continual use' of the easement by the owners of the dominant estate from
1969, when the Bennett family sold the property, to 1985, when Mr.
Shirley's parents acquired the property.'
Therefore, although the court sought to clarify much of the confusion
surrounding prescriptive easements in South Carolina, the court's analysis
regarding continual use, tacking, and nonuse creates more questions than it
answers. This opinion, now acting as valuable precedent itself, has the
potential to have a ripple effect into future analysis of these principles as
well as easement principles that would have been more appropriately applied
in the court's analysis. This Note examines how the court misapplied these
12. See id at 304, 772 S.E.2d at 169 ("Shirley claims the Court of Appeals erred in
ruling ... that Bundy's grant of permission to build a gate on the disputed road defeated his
claim for a prescriptive easement.").
13. Id at 312, 772 S.E.2d at 174.
14. Id at 297, 772 S.E.2d at 166.
15. Id at 315, 772 S.E.2d at 175.
16. Id at 312, 772 S.E.2d at 174.
17. Note that previously in this case, "the special referee concluded that Shirley proved
by a preponderance of the evidence that the Bennett family [satisfied the elements of a
prescriptive easement]." Id. at 299, 772 S.E.2d at 167 (emphasis added). After explicitly
adopting a heightened standard of proof, the Supreme Court of South Carolina did not address
whether this standard was met, and instead reversed the special referee's finding on the lack of
continual use basis. Id. at 315, 772 S.E.2d at 175.
18. Id at 314, 772 S.E.2d at 175.
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previously settled principles in South Carolina easement law, proposes how
the court could have more appropriately analyzed Mr. Shirley's claims, and
explores how its failure to do so could have a significant long-term impact
on the future of prescriptive easement cases in South Carolina.
II. BACKGROUND
A. What is a Prescriptive Easement?
As a general matter, an easement is "[a]n interest in land owned by
another person, consisting of the right to use or control the land, or an area
above or below it, for a specific limited purpose."19 The property that
receives the benefit of the easement is known as the dominant estate, while
the property burdened by it is known as the servient estate.20 Further, a
prescriptive easement is "one created from an open, adverse, and continuous
use over a statutory period."2 1 Within South Carolina, a claimant was
traditionally required to show the following to establish a prescriptive
easement: "(1) The continued and uninterrupted use or enjoyment of the
right for a period of 20 years; (2) the identity of the thing enjoyed; (3) that
the use or enjoyment was adverse, or under claim of right." 22 The court in
19. Easement, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). See also Windham v.
Riddle, 381 S.C. 192, 201, 672 S.E.2d 578, 582 (2009) (quoting Douglas v. Med. Investors,
Inc., 256 S.C. 440, 445, 182 S.E.2d 720, 722 (1971)) ("An easement is a right which one
person has to use the land of another for a specific purpose, and gives no title to the land on
which the servitude is imposed.").
20. Estate, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
21. Prescriptive Easement, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
22. Simmons v. Berkeley Elec. Coop. Inc., No. 2013-001477, 2016 WL 6520167, at *3
(S.C. Nov. 2, 2016) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Williamson v. Abbott, 107 S.C. 397, 400-01,
93 S.E. 15, 15-16 (1917)). The court in Simmons held that this standard could be simplified by
requiring a claimant to show that "his use has been open, notorious, continuous, uninterrupted,
and contrary to the true property owner's rights for a period of twenty years." Id. at *4.
However, this new test was adopted as a means of eliminating confusion surrounding the third
traditional element and was in no way intended to change the substance and standards of the
first two elements. Id. at *3 (citing Simmons v. Berkeley Elec. Co-op. Inc., 404 S.C. 172, 182,
744 S.E.2d 580, 586 (Ct. App. 2013)) (holding that the Court of Appeals erred in allowing two
methods for establishing the third element, but taking no issue with the Court of Appeals
holding that a prescriptive easement had been established based on evidence that, "the water
main has been used continuously and uninterruptedly for more than twenty years"). Therefore,
because the court in Bundy, and the majority of South Carolina cases, interpret prescriptive
easement claims using the elements of "continued and uninterrupted use or enjoyment of the
right for a period of 20 years" and "the identity of the thing enjoyed," this Note will rely on the
traditional language of these first two elements for simplicity purposes. See Bundy v. Shirley,
412 S.C. 292, 304, 772 S.E.2d 163, 169-79 (2015) (citing Pittman v. Lowther, 363 S.C. 47,
50, 610 S.E.2d 479, 480 (2005)) (relying on the traditional elements).
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Bundy noted that there has been confusion among both judges and lawyers
23
as to the standard of proof required to satisfy these elements. The court
definitively adopted the requirement that these elements must be proven
through clear and convincing evidence, rather than a mere preponderance of
evidence.24 Unfortunately, the court further added to the confusion
surrounding prescriptive easements in its actual analysis of the elements,
specifically, the element of "continued and uninterrupted use or enjoyment
of the right for a period of twenty years."25
B. What Constitutes 'Continued and Uninterrupted Use' for the
Prescriptive Period?
It is uncontested that the required prescriptive period in South Carolina
26is twenty years. Further, "in order to satisfy the continual use requirement,
the use must only be of a reasonable frequency as determined from the
nature and needs of the claimant."27 Therefore, the frequency of use required
for a use to be continual will be much less if the claimant only used the
easement o access his rural, secondary property than it would be if he used
the easement to access his primary residence.28 Further, this continual use
must only be shown for the duration of the twenty-year prescriptive period.29
23. Bundy, 412 S.C. at 304, 772 S.E.2d at 170 (noting that prior cases either, "(1)
simply outline the elements of a prescriptive easement and identify the claimant as having the
burden of proving these elements; or (2) analogize the establishment of a prescriptive
easement o that of adverse possession, which requires clear and convincing proof").
24. Id. at 305, 772 S.E.2d at 170.
25. Simmons, 2016 WL 6520167, at *3.
26. See, e.g., Bundy, 412 S.C. at 304, 772 S.E.2d at 169; Paine Gayle Props. v. CSX
Transp., 400 S.C. 568, 583, 735 S.E.2d 528, 536 (Ct. App. 2012).
27. Kelley v. Snyder, 396 S.C. 564, 573, 722 S.E.2d 813, 818 (Ct. App. 2012) (quoting
Jones v. Daley, 363 S.C. 310, 318, 609 S.E.2d 597, 601 (Ct. App. 2005)).
28. Compare Jones, 363 S.C. 310, 609 S.E.2d 597 (involving rural land that the
claimant occasionally used for farming and harvesting timber), with Rhett v. Gray, 401 S.C.
478, 736 S.E.2d 873 (Ct. App. 2013) (involving land on which the claimant constructed his
primary residence).
29. Cf Jones, 363 S.C. at 318, 722 S.E.2d at 600-01 (citing Cuthbert v. Lawton, 14
S.C.L. 194 (3 McCord 194) (Ct. App. L. & Eq. 1825)) ("We note, however, that under long
established principles of South Carolina law, once a right of way by prescription has been
established by twenty years of continuous use, a later diminishment in the frequency of that
use does not necessarily nullify the established right by prescription.").
2017] 799
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C. What is Tacking?
Tacking allows a claimant to add his period of adverse use to the period
of adverse use of his predecessor in title in order to satisfy the twenty-year
requirement.30 In order to tack onto the period of use of another, the claimant
must have some sort of direct relationship with this predecessor in title. This
relationship is known as privity of estate.3' In other words, a claimant cannot
32tack his use to the use of a stranger. However, it is only when a party's
adverse use of an easement falls short of the twenty-year prescriptive period
that tacking becomes an issue.33
This distinction is perfectly exemplified in the facts of Bundy v. Shirley.
Mr. Shirley only owned the dominant estate for a period of just over four
years and, therefore, would have to argue that his period of use tacked to his
parents' period of use in order to establish the requisite twenty years of
use.34 Alternatively, the Bennett family, who owned the dominant estate
from 1947 to 1969, could rely solely on their personal use of the easement o
satisfy the twenty year requirement.35
D. How Did the Court in Bundy Apply the Principle of Tacking?
The court held that Mr. Shirley and his parents failed to acquire a
prescriptive easement during their ownership because their use was
36permissive, rather than adverse. Therefore, Mr. Shirley's only remaining
claim relied on the notion that the Bennett family acquired a prescriptive
easement during its ownership and that this right of use passed with the
dominant estate.37 It was in the analysis of this claim that the court applied
the principle of tacking.38 The court held that because Mr. Shirley presented
30. Kelly, 396 S.C. at 575, 722 S.E.2d at 819. See also Morrow v. Dyches, 328 S.C.
522, 527, 492 S.E.2d 420, 423 (Ct. App. 1997) ("A party may 'tack' the period of use of prior
owners in order to satisfy the 20-year requirement.").
31. See Bundy, 412 S.C. at 313-14, 772 S.E.2d at 175 (quoting JON W. BRUCE & JAMES
W. ELY, JR., THE LAW OF EASEMENTS AND LICENSES IN LAND § 5:19 (2015)) ("Although the
requirement of privity has been variously defined, the prevailing view is that there must be
some relationship whereby the successive users have come into possession under or through
their predecessors in interest.").
32. See BRUCE & ELY, supra note 31, § 5:19.
33. See, e.g., Kelley, 396 S.C. at 575, 722 S.E.2d at 819 (providing that a tacking
analysis had to be performed where the claimant's use fell just shy of nineteen years).
34. Bundy, 412 S.C. at 297-98, 772 S.E.2d at 166.
35. Id. at 299, 772 S.E.2d at 166.
36. Id. at 312, 772 S.E.2d at 174.
37. Id.
38. Id.
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no evidence that the owners of the dominant estate from 1969 to 1985
continued to use the dirt road, "[Mr.] Shirley could not tack the Bennett
family's use to establish his prescriptive easement claim." 39 The court
reasoned that the lack of evidence pertaining to the use during this period
was fatal to Mr. Shirley's claim because, "our case law regarding
prescriptive easements has evolved and now refers to and requires 'continual
use' for the easement o remain viable to subsequent claimants."40
III. ANALYSIS
Much like the proverbial Dutch boy with his finger in the dam, the
Bundy opinion sought to address an apparent problem, only to have a brand
new one arise as a result of its efforts. While the court in Bundy finally
settled the standard of proof required to establish a prescriptive easement,
the court's analysis regarding continual use and tacking misapplies these
previously well-settled principles. This misapplication not only creates
uncertainty regarding the future application of these particular principles, but
also creates the potential for further upheaval with regard to the principles
that would have been more appropriately applied in this case.
A. Where Exactly Did the Court Go Wrong in Bundy?
41
Mr. Shirley relied on an 1825 case to assert that once the Bennett
family's prescriptive easement "perfected," it could only be defeated by
adverse obstruction by the owner of the servient estate for a period of five
years.42 Admittedly, this five-year obstruction period seems inexplicable and
appears to have gained little support in subsequent cases.43 However, the
court in Bundy elected to explain away this precedent by asserting that, "[i]n
the 190 years since the Cuthbert decision was issued, our case law regarding
prescriptive easements has evolved and now refers to and requires 'continual
use' for the easement o remain viable to subsequent claimants."44 It is with
this assertion that the opinion went awry.
39. Id. at 314, 772 S.E.2d at 175 (emphasis added).
40. Id. at 312, 772 S.E.2d at 174.
41. Cuthbert v. Lawton, 14 S.C.L. 194 (3 McCord 194) (Ct. App. L. & Eq. 1825).
42. Bundy, 412 S.C. at 312, 772 S.E.2d at 174.
43. See Cuthbert, 14 S.C.L. 194 (3 McCord 194) (asserting the five-year obstruction
requirement without citing to any authority).
44. Bundy, 412 S.C. at 312, 772 S.E.2d at 174 (emphasis added).
2017] 801
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1. Where Did This 'Continual Use'Requirement Arise?
A separate and distinct requirement for continual use between claimants
appears unprecedented. This seems particularly odd considering it is
supposedly the product of 190 years of evolving case law regarding
prescriptive easements.45 In asserting the development of this additional
element, the court in Bundy relied on the following language:
[U]nder long established principles of South Carolina law, once a
right of way by prescription has been established by twenty years of
continuous use, a later diminishment in the frequency of that use
does not necessarily nullify the established right by prescription.
Furthermore, in order to satisfy the continual use requirement, the
use must only be of a reasonable frequency as determined from the
46nature and needs of the claimant.
This language does not assert that an additional element of "continual
use" is required for the easement o remain viable to subsequent claimants.
When the quote is read as a whole, the "continual use" in the second
sentence clearly and unequivocally refers to the "twenty years of continuous
use" that is discussed in the immediately preceding sentence.47
In the Jones opinion itself, this second sentence is cited with the
following parenthetical, "[The element of continued use] does not require
the use thereof every day for the statutory period or even on a weekly or
monthly basis . ... 48 In Jones, the claimant was not a South Carolina
resident, making her use of a purported easement to access a property
sporadic, but numerous nonetheless.49 The language that the court in Bundy
cited to was an instruction to the special referee on remand, regarding how
to interpret whether Jones's sporadic use for the twenty year prescriptive
50period was sufficiently continuous to vest into a prescriptive easement.
This language is wholly irrelevant in terms of whether continual use must be
shown for the easement to remain viable to subsequent users of the road.
45. Id.
46. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Jones v. Daley, 363 S.C. 310, 318, 609 S.E.2d 597,
600-01 (Ct. App. 2005)).
47. See id.
48. Jones, 363 S.C. at 318, 609 S.E.2d at 600-01 (emphasis added) (quoting JILL
GUSTAFSON, 25 AM. JUR. 2D EASEMENTS AND LICENSES § 68 (2016)).
49. Id. at 313, 609 S.E.2d at 598.
50. Id. at 318, 609 S.E.2d at 600-01.
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There is simply no basis for asserting that case law since Cuthbert has
evolved to create an entirely new element.
2. How Did the Court Apply This New Continual Use
Requirement?
Having created this unprecedented requirement, the court in Bundy
focused on the fact that Mr. Shirley did not establish that the owners from
1969 to 1985 continued to use the disputed road adversely and under claim
of right.5 ' Relying on this fact, the court in Bundy ultimately held that, "the
Court of Appeals correctly found that Shirley could not tack the Bennett
family's use to establish his prescriptive easement claim."52 As discussed
above, tacking only becomes an issue where a party's use does not satisfy
the twenty-year requirement.53 Again, the court relied on two very dissimilar
cases to articulate its reasoning. Kelley involved a claimant who had only
54used the road at issue for nineteen years and Morrow involved a claimant
who had only used the road at issue for five years. In both instances, the
claimant sought to establish continuous use for a twenty-year period by
tacking his or her use to the use of his or her predecessor in title.
As the Restatements succinctly describe tacking, "[p]eriods of
prescriptive use may be tacked together to make up the prescriptive period if
there is a transfer between the prescriptive users of either the inchoate
servitude or the estate benefited by the inchoate servitude."5  Only when the
easement at issue is inchoate, due to an insufficient period of use, does
tacking apply.5 Additionally, such tacking must be between two prescriptive
59users.
Mr. Shirley did not seek to add his period of use to a period of use of
another. In fact, Mr. Shirley's claim with regard to the Bennett family's use
is predicated on the notion that Mr. Shirley's personal use was found not to
51. Bundy, 412 S.C. at 314, 772 S.E.2dat 175.
52. Id (emphasis added).
53. See, e.g., Kelley v. Snyder, 396 S.C. 564, 575, 722 S.E.2d 813, 819 (Ct. App. 2012)
(providing that a tacking analysis had to be performed where the claimant's use fell just shy of
nineteen years).
54. Id
55. Morrow v. Dyches, 328 S.C. 522, 529, 492 S.E.2d 420, 424 (Ct. App. 1997).
56. Kelley, 396 S.C. at 575, 722 S.E.2d at 819; Morrow, 328 S.C. at 529, 492 S.E.2d at
424.
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60be adverse, or under a claim of right. If his use was permissive it could
61
never ripen into a prescriptive easement, no matter how long the duration.
Therefore, there would be no reason to tack to Mr. Shirley's use. Instead,
Mr. Shirley's claim was predicated on the notion that the Bennett family's
use ripened into a prescriptive easement itself62 Once this easement was
63established, it passed with the dominant estate. Such a claim is not
properly addressed by a tacking analysis and cannot be defeated by a lack of
continual use.
B. Why Is Any of This Significant?
Even though prescriptive easements can be traced all the way back to
64English common law, South Carolina courts have continuously struggled
65with providing a consistent application of the law. Although the opinion in
Bundy marks a significant step towards consistency in its express adoption
of the "clear and convincing" standard of proof,66 the court then added to the
confusion by articulating a new element that appears without basis in
centuries of case law. This is just the sort of issue that the Supreme Court of
South Carolina recently had to rectify in Simmons. In Simmons, the court
held that "the Court of Appeals erred in recognizing two methods of proving
the third element of a prescriptive easement."67
60. Bundy v. Shirley, 412 S.C. 292, 312, 772 S.E.2d 163, 174 (2015).
61. See Paine Gayle Props., LLC v. CSX Transp., Inc., 400 S.C. 568, 584, 735 S.E.2d
528, 537 (Ct. App. 2012) (quoting Williamson v. Abbott, 107 S.C. 397, 400-01, 93 S.E. 15, 16
(1917)) ("[U]se by express or implied permission or license, no matter how long continued,
cannot ripen into an easement by prescription .... .").
62. Cf RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 2.17 (2000) (providing that
tacking is a principle that only applies with inchoate, or unripened, easements).
63. This argument goes under the assumption that the prescriptive easement established
by the Bennett family was appurtenant, which we will address below. JOHN B. McARTHUR, 12
S.C. JUR. Easements § 3 (2016) (footnote omitted) (citing Smith v. Comm'r of Pub. Works,
312 S.C. 460, 441 S.E.2d 331 (Ct. App. 1994)) ("An appurtenant easement runs with the land
of the dominant estate although a conveyance of the dominant estate does not expressly
mention it.").
64. 12 S.C. JUR. Easements § 10 (2016) (footnote omitted) ("The 20-year rule for a
prescriptive easement was adopted from the English common law rule.").
65. See, e.g., Simmons v. Berkeley Elec. Coop. Inc., No. 2013-001477, 2016 WL
6520167, at *3 (S.C. Nov. 2, 2016) ("We acknowledge that this Court's decisions have helped
give rise to this error and now take this opportunity to clarify the third element of a
prescriptive easement."); Bundy, 412 S.C. at 304, 772 S.E.2d at 170 ("Although the elements
of a prescriptive easement are well-established, the standard of proof as to these elements has
given rise to confusion among the bench and bar.").
66. Bundy, 412 S.C. at 304, 772 S.E.2d at 170.
67. Simmons, 2016 WL 6520167, at *3.
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The court gracefully recognized its role in the confusion, tracing the
history of this third element which started as, "(3) that it is adverse to the
right of some other person"'6 but then became, "(3) that the use or
enjoyment was adverse, or under claim of right"69 before ultimately
becoming, "(3) that the use or enjoyment was adverse or under claim of
right."7 0 The court noted that the second version of the third element, with
the comma, was "intended to modify the term 'adverse,' not create another
method to establish the claim."7  However, the subsequent, seemingly
inadvertent, omission of this comma created two distinct methods for
establishing this third element and resulted in over seventy years of
*72confusion.
Similar to the way the Williamson court sought only to modify the third
element,73 the reference to "continual use" in Jones was clearly meant only
to clarify the sort of use that would constitute continuous use within the first
element of prescriptive easements.74 As Justice Cardozo noted, "[t]he half-
truths of one generation tend at times to perpetuate themselves in the law as
the whole truths of another, when constant repetition brings it about that
qualifications, taken once for granted, are disregarded or forgotten."75 The
"continual use" requirement introduced in Bundy is simply the result of
"continuous use over a statutory period" being stripped of the qualification
that it need only be shown "over the statutory period."
The true confusion resulting from this new requirement arises in the
application of previously well-settled easement principles. By failing to
analyze Mr. Shirley's claim under these principles, practitioners and lower
courts will be forced to speculate regarding the extent to which these
principles still apply and how they should work in conjunction with the
continual use requirement.
68. Id (citing Lawton v. Rivers, 13 S.C.L. 445, 451 (2 McCord) (1823)).
69. Id (citing Williamson v. Abbott, 107 S.C. 397, 400-01, 93 S.E. 15, 16 (1917)).
70. Id at n.3 (citing Steele v. Williams, 204 S.C. 124, 133, 28 S.E.2d 644, 648 (1944)).
71. Id at *3 (footnote omitted).
72. But see id (stating that the Court did "not [intend to] create another method to
establish a claim").
73. Williamson, 107 S.C. at 400,93 S.E. at 15-16.
74. See Jones v. Daley, 363 S.C. 310, 318, 609 S.E.2d 597, 601 (Ct. App. 2005).
75. Allegheny Coll. v. Nat'l Chautauqua Cty. Bank of Jamestown, 246 N.Y. 369, 373,
159 N.E. 173, 173 (1927).
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C. How Could the Court in Bundy Have More Appropriately Analyzed
Mr. Shirley's Second Claim?
Although the court in Bundy noted that Mr. Shirley might have
presented insufficient evidence to establish that the Bennett family acquired
a prescriptive easement during its period of ownership, the court ultimately
elected to hold that Mr. Shirley did not have a prescriptive easement on
76other grounds. Operating under this same assumption, that the Bennetts
acquired a prescriptive easement, the analysis of whether this easement
passed to Mr. Shirley must begin with the time when this right vested or
ripened. In South Carolina, "[t]he general rule appears to be that, absent
termination due to circumstances such as abandonment, estoppel, end of
necessity, merger, release, or prescription by the servient tenement, an
appurtenant easement and an easement in gross of a commercial character
are perpetual and irrevocable."
1. Was the Bennett Family's Prescriptive Easement Appurtenant
or In Gross?79
All easements can be classified as either "appurtenant" or "in gross."so
In South Carolina, to classify as an appurtenant easement, the easement
"must inhere in the land, concern the premises, have one terminus on the
land of the party claiming it, and be essentially necessary to the enjoyment
thereof."8 Appurtenant easements inhere in the land and pass with the
82
dominant estate. However, an easement in gross is "a mere personal
privilege to the owner of the land and incapable of transfer by him, and is
not, therefore assignable or inheritable."83 In Bundy, this distinction is
critical in that if the Bennett family acquired an easement in gross, the
76. Bundy, 412 S.C. at 314, 772 S.E.2d at 175.
77. This would have to have been at some time between 1967 and 1969, after the
Bennett family would have had the opportunity to have used the disputed road for twenty
years, but before the Bennett family conveyed the property to another individual.
78. 12 S.C. JUR. Easements §29 (2016).
79. Since there was no mention within the record that Mr. Shirley or any of his
predecessors in title used the property for commercial purposes, there is no need to discuss the
unique exception for easements in gross for a commercial character.
80. Tupper v. Dorchester Cty., 326 S.C. 318, 325, 487 S.E.2d 187, 191 (1997); Sandy
Island Corp. v. Ragsdale, 246 S.C. 414, 420, 143 S.E.2d 803, 806 (1965); Brasington v.
Williams, 143 S.C. 223, 141 S.E. 375, 382 (1927).
81. Sandy Island Corp., 246 S.C. at 420, 143 S.E.2d at 806.
82. Id.
83. Id. (citing Steele v. Williams, 204 S.C. 124, 124, 28 S.E.2d 644, 646 (1944);
Brasington, 143 S.C. at 223, 141 S.E. at 382).
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easement likely could not be assigned to a subsequent owner of the
property.84 However, if it were deemed an appurtenant easement, it would
run with the dominant estate, which ultimately ended up in the possession of
Mr. Shirley.
South Carolina purports to follow the majority rule that, "[e]asements in
gross are not favored by the courts, and an easement will never be presumed
as personal when it may fairly be construed as appurtenant to some other
estate." Despite this express preference for appurtenant easements, South
Carolina courts are very strict in requiring that all of the elements of an
appurtenant easement must be shown, including that the easement has a
terminus on the dominant estate and that the easement is essentially
necessary. 1 Although a grantor's intent will be given effect so long as it
does not contravene any settled rule or public policy, 7 prescriptive
easements present a unique situation in which there is no deed or other
document that expressly creates the easement.88 Therefore, the analysis of
84. Though it is possible to create an easement in gross that is assignable, courts will
typically look to the language creating the easement to determine whether that was the intent
of the parties. See, e.g., Gressette v. S.C. Elec. & Gas Co., 370 S.C. 377, 382, 635 S.E.2d 538,
541 (2006) (citing Sandy Island Corp., 246 S.C. at 420, 143 S.E.2d at 806). In Bundy, this
would present two major hurdles: (1) there was no document granting the easement to
evidence the intent of the parties; and (2) the opinion does not mention that Mr. Shirley has
presented any evidence of such assignments. Bundy v. Shirley, 412 S.C. 292, 299, 772 S.E.2d
163, 167 (2015).
85. Rhett v. Gray, 401 S.C. 478, 492, 736 S.E.2d 873, 880 (Ct. App. 2013) (quoting
Smith v. Comm'rs of Pub. Works of City of Charleston, 312 S.C. 460, 467, 441 S.E.2d 331,
336 (Ct. App. 1994)); see also BRUCE & ELY, supra note 31, § 2:3, at n.12 ("There is a
constructional preference for easements appurtenant over easements in gross. In fact, the rule
that an easement should be presumed appurtenant is often characterized as strong.").
86. See, e.g., Tupper v. Dorchester Cty., 326 S.C. 318, 325-26, 487 S.E.2d 187, 191
(1997) (citing McARTHUR, supra note 63, § 3, at 1) ("Unless an easement has all the elements
necessary to be an appurtenant easement, it will be characterized as a mere easement in
gross."); see also BRUCE & ELY, supra note 31, § 2:3, at n.12 (citing Tupper, 326 S.C. at 326,
487 S.E.2d at 191) ("In contrast [to the presumption that an easement is appurtenant], the
Supreme Court of South Carolina has taken the position that an appurtenant easement must be
'essentially necessary' to the enjoyment of a dominant estate, and that an easement will be
treated as one in gross unless this element can be shown.").
87. Windham v. Riddle, 381 S.C. 192, 201, 672 S.E.2d 578, 582-83 (2009) (quoting
Wayburn v. Smith, 270 S.C. 38, 41-42, 239 S.E.2d 890, 892 (1977)).
88. See Boyd v. Bellsouth Tel. Tel. Co., 369 S.C. 410, 419-20, 633 S.E.2d 136, 141
(2006) (citing Clemson Univ. v. First Provident Corp., 260 S.C. 640, 652, 197 S.E.2d 914, 919
(1973) ("A prescriptive easement is not implied by law but is established by the conduct of the
dominant tenement owner; however, easements by prior use and by necessity are implied by
law."); McARTHUR, supra note 63, § 3 ("A prescriptive easement arises not from an express
grant or reservation or by implication, but is established by conduct of the owner of the
dominant tenement contrary to the fee simple interest of the owner of the servient tenement.");
GUSTAFSON, supra note 48, §§ 22, 30 ("A prescriptive easement is not implied by law but is
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whether a prescriptive easement is appurtenant or in gross must begin with
an evaluation of whether the conduct of the owner of the dominant estate
established the necessary elements for an appurtenant easement.89
It should be noted that South Carolina courts have never directly
analyzed whether a prescriptive easement is appurtenant or in gross.
However, the court in Rhett provided that, "where the owner of a right of
way appurtenant to a certain tract uses it for the period of prescription as
appurtenant also to another tract, he gains a prescriptive right to such
enlarged use."90 Thus the court has noted that prescriptive use may be used
in a manner appurtenant o a particular tract. Further, numerous surrounding
jurisdictions have been willing to recognize a prescriptive easement as
appurtenant.91 Assuming that a prescriptive easement satisfies each element
required for an appurtenant easement, case law would suggest that a court
92will never interpret the easement as personal or in gross. Further, in South
Carolina, an appurtenant easement passes with the dominant estate
regardless of whether it was mentioned in the deed.93
established by the conduct of the dominant tenement owner; however, easements by prior use
and by necessity are implied by law.").
89. BRUCE & ELY, supra note 31, § 2.3 ("Implied easements rest on a showing that they
are necessary for the utilization of a dominant estate, so they are invariably appurtenant to the
claimant's parcel.").
90. Rhett v. Gray, 401 S.C. 478, 496, 736 S.E.2d 873, 883 (quoting Ogle v. Trotter, 495
S.W.2d 558, 566 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1973)).
91. See, e.g., Andrews v. Hatten, 794 So.2d 1184, 1188 (Ala. Civ. App. 2001);
Boccanfuso v. Conner, 89 Conn. App. 260, 268, 873 A.2d 208, 216 (2005); Deans v.
Mansfield, 210 N.C. App. 222, 229, 707 S.E.2d 658, 664 (2011); Shrewsbury v. Humphrey,
183 W. Va. 291, 295, 395 S.E.2d 535, 539 (1990); see generally BRUCE & ELY, supra note 31,
§ 2.3 ("Implied easements rest on a showing that they are necessary for the utilization of a
dominant estate, so they are invariably appurtenant to the claimant's parcel."); ERIC M.
LARSON, 42 CAUSES OF ACTION 2D 111 (2009) (citing Oshita v. Hill, 65 N.C.App. 326, 308
S.E.2d 923 (1983)) ("If an appurtenant prescriptive easement came into being while the
benefited tract was owned by the predecessor in interest of the current owner, the current
owner may have standing to claim prescriptive rights without showing that he or she made
regular use of the claimed easement.").
92. Rhett, 401 S.C. at 492, 736 S.E.2d at 880 (quoting Smith v. Comm'rs of Pub. Works
of City of Charleston, 312 S.C. 460, 467, 441 S.E.2d 331, 336 (Ct. App. 1994)).
93. BRUCE & ELY, supra note 31, § 9:1 at n.3 (citing Tupper v. Dorchester Cty., 326
S.C. 318, 325, 487 S.E.2d 187, 191 (1997); Sandy Island Corp. v. Ragsdale, 246 S.C. 414,
420, 143 S.E.2d 803, 806 (1965); Smith, 312 S.C. at 467-68, 441 S.E.2d at 336) ("Unless
limited by the terms of creation or transfer, appurtenant easements follow ownership of the
dominant estate through successive transfers.").
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a. Did the Disputed Road Inhere in the Land and Concern the
Premises?
When evaluating claims involving appurtenant easements, courts have
repeatedly recited that such easements must inhere in the land and concern
the premises, but have never directly addressed what is required to satisfy
these two elements.94 In several cases, South Carolina courts have held that
roadways used for the purposes of ingress and egress to the dominant estate
classify as appurtenant easements.95 Based on South Carolina's presumption
that an easement will be deemed in gross unless each element of an
appurtenant easement is satisfied,96 it can be reasonably inferred that a
roadway across the servient estate for the purposes of ingress and egress to
the dominant estate must inhere in the land and concern the premises.
The disputed road in Bundy was for the limited purpose of ingress and
egress to Mr. Shirley's property.97 Therefore, like the easements in both
Smith and Proctor, it is one that both inheres in the land and concerns the
premises.
b. Did the Disputed Road Have a Terminus on Mr. Shirley's
Property?
Put simply, this element requires that an easement come to an endpoint
on the dominant estate. Alleyways between the two estates provide the
perfect illustration of what this element requires.98 In Steele, the plaintiff
94. See, e.g., Windham v. Riddle, 381 S.C. 192, 201, 672 S.E.2d 578, 583 (2009) (citing
Tupper, 326 S.C. at 325-26, 487 S.E.2d at 191)); Carolina Land Co. v. Bland, 265 S.C. 98,
106, 217 S.E.2d 16, 20 (1975) (citing Sandy Island Corp., 246 S.C. at 420, 143 S.E.2d at 806);
Brasington v. Williams, 143 S.C. 223, 141 S.E. 375, 382 (1927)).
95. See, e.g., Smith, 312 S.C. at 469, 441 S.E.2d at 337 (holding that the owner of the
dominant estate had an appurtenant easement across the servient estate for ingress and egress
to a canal); Proctor v. Steedley, 398 S.C. 561, 574, 730 S.E.2d 357, 364 (Ct. App. 2012)
(affirming the special referee's holding that an easement for an access road across the servient
estate was an appurtenant easement).
96. Tupper, 326 S.C. at 325-26, 487 S.E.2d at 191 (citing McARTHUR, supra note 63,
§ 3(c)) ("Unless an easement has all the elements necessary to be an appurtenant
easement . . . it will be characterized as a mere easement in gross.").
97. Bundy v. Shirley, 412 S.C. 292, 298, 772 S.E.2d 163, 166 (2015).
98. See, e.g., Shia v. Pendergrass, 222 S.C. 342, 351, 72 S.E.2d 699, 703 (1952)
(holding that, where the claimant sought to establish an appurtenant easement over an
alleyway, "[t]he evidence fails to establish that the alleged right of way has a terminus on
respondent's lot, and the absence of a terminus on his property is fatal to his claim to an
appurtenant easement"); Steele v. Williams, 204 S.C. 124, 133, 28 S.E.2d 644, 647 (1944)
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sought to establish an appurtenant easement for the use of an alleyway that
ran between his building and another.99 However, the court refused to
interpret this easement as appurtenant, regardless of the apparent intent of
the parties, because the easement had two termini on two public roadways
rather than on the dominant estate.00 Similarly, the Court of Appeals of
South Carolina held that an easement could not be appurtenant, for lack of a
terminus on the land of the party claiming it, where the easement at issue
was granted in favor of an individual who was not the owner of the
dominant estate.'0' Presumably, an easement could also fail for lack of
terminus where the easement traverses the dominate estate before
terminating on a neighboring property.102
None of those scenarios appear to be present regarding the disputed road
in Bundy. Instead, Mr. Shirley's amended answer and counterclaim
expressly provided that the disputed road ultimately terminated on Mr.
Shirley's property.103 This was further evidenced by the duly recorded 1960
Plat in Mr. Bundy's chain of title that appears to indicate this terminus.104
99. Steele, 204 S.C. at 124, 28 S.E.2d at 645.
100. Id. at 124, 28 S.E.2d at 647.
101. Springob v. Farrar, 334 S.C. 585, 589, 514 S.E.2d 135, 143 (Ct. App. 1999).
102. Whaley v. Stevens, 21 S.C. 221, 224 (1884) (holding that an appurtenant easement
cannot exist where "the plaintiff owns the middle of the road").
103. Amended Answer & Counterclaim at 2, Bundy v. Shirley, 412 S.C. 292, 772 S.E.2d
163 (2015) (No. 2009-CP-28-00338), 2010 WL 10933679, at ¶ 6.
104. Id.
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c. Was the Use of the Disputed Road Essentially Necessary to
the Enjoyment of the Dominant Estate?
In Proctor, the court held that an access road was essentially necessary
to the enjoyment of the dominant estate where the dominant estate was
bisected by a creek with deep ravines on either side and the access road
across the servient estate was the only reasonable means to access the
northern portion of the property.'0o Although the owner of the dominant
estate testified that a bridge could be built over the creek, the court held that
there was nothing in the record to indicate that this option was either
reasonable or affordable.06
Conversely, in Windham, the court held that it was questionable whether
an easement for access to a pond for irrigation was essentially necessary
when the dominant estate was bordered by a river that provided a reasonable
alternative for irrigation.107 Similar to Windham, the court in Tupper held
that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether an easement was
essentially necessary to the enjoyment of the claimants' estate where the
claimants asserted that they had no means of access to their property other
than via the easement, but testimony at a hearing showed that alternative
routes were merely inconvenient. os
Based on the record of the case, it appears that Mr. Shirley acquired the
exact same estate as possessed by the Bennett family, no more and no
less.109 Assuming that the Bennett family used the disputed road as a means
of ingress and egress for its landlocked property, it would be difficult to
contend that this easement was not essentially necessary for the family's
enjoyment of the estate. The record does not indicate any reasonable
alternative means of ingress and egress to the property. Depriving the owner
of the dominant estate the right to use this easement would effectively
eliminate the owner's ability to enjoy the property.
An argument could be made that the Bennett family could have sought a
path through another neighboring property. However, like the notion of
building a bridge over the creek in Proctor, there is nothing to indicate that
105. Proctor v. Steedley, 398 S.C. 561, 575, 730 S.E.2d 357, 364 (Ct. App. 2012).
106. Id. at 575, 730 S.E.2d at 365.
107. Windham v. Riddle, 381 S.C. 192, 204, 672 S.E.2d 578, 584 (2009).
108. Tupper v. Dorchester Cty., 326 S.C. 318, 326, 487 S.E.2d 187, 191 (1997); see also
Steele v. Williams, 204 S.C. 124, 131, 28 S.E.2d 644, 647 (1944) (holding that an easement
for ingress and egress was not essentially necessary when the dominant estate had seventy feet
of frontage on a public, paved street).
109. Amended Answer & Counterclaim at 1-3, Bundy v. Shirley, 412 S.C. 292, 772
S.E.2d 163 (2015) (No. 2009-CP-28-00338), 2010 WL 10933679, at ¶ 1-18.
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such an option would be either affordable or reasonable. Further, there are
no South Carolina cases that have held that seeking an easement or right of
way across a different neighbor's property is a reasonable alternative.
Ultimately, whether the option to negotiate a right of way with a third party
makes an easement not essentially necessary is an unsettled issue.
d. Why Did the Court Not Address This in Gross Versus
Appurtenant Analysis?
Based on the facts provided in the opinions and public record, there
appears to be sufficient evidence to find that the Bennett family obtained an
appurtenant easement through prescription. Admittedly, the record is
somewhat limited due to the fact that Mr. Shirley did not appear to raise the
appurtenant easement argument beyond his amended answer and
counterclaim."0
Mr. Shirley, in his amended answer and counterclaim, asserted that,
"Defendant enjoys a private permanent easement appurtenant for ingress and
egress and utilities from the Defendant's property to the terminus of Saxon
Road. [sic] such private easement appurtenant being established as an
easement by prescription as set forth above.""' Despite specifically pleading
this defense, there is absolutely no mention of easements in gross versus
appurtenant easements within any of the three Bundy opinions.112 Based on
the detailed Supreme Court of South Carolina opinion, it appears highly
likely that Mr. Shirley abandoned this argument and chose to more directly
rely on the Cuthbert opinion to assert that once a prescriptive easement is
perfected, it "could only be defeated by an adverse and continued
obstruction for five years."113
This would have been a perfect opportunity for the court to explain that
190 years of easement case law has developed the requirement that an
easement must qualify as appurtenant in order for it to run with the dominant
estate and that such easements may still be terminated in a variety of ways,
beyond mere adverse and continued obstruction. Since South Carolina will
110. Amended Answer and Counterclaim at 5, Bundy v. Shirley, 412 S.C. 292, 772
S.E.2d 163 (2015) (No. 2009-CP-28-00338), 2010 WL 10933679, at ¶ 32.
111. Id.
112. See Bundy v. Shirley, 412 S.C. 292, 298, 772 S.E.2d 163, 166 (2015); Bundy v.
Shirley, No. 2013-UP-153, 2013 WL 8507861 (S.C. Ct. App. May 8, 2013), affd as modified,
412 S.C. 292, 772 S.E.2d 163 (2015); Bundy v. Shirley, No. 2009-CP-28-0338 (S.C. Com. Pl.
2011), 2011 WL 11740811.
113. Bundy, 412 S.C. at 312, 772 S.E.2d at 174 (quoting Cuthbert v. Lawton, 14 S.C.L.
194, 3 McCord 194 (Ct. App. 1825).
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find an easement o be in gross unless all of the essential elements of an
appurtenant easement are shown,14 Mr. Shirley's failure to argue and
present evidence pertaining to these elements could still have been fatal to
his claim. However, assuming that the Bennett family created an appurtenant
easement hrough its use, this easement would be perpetual and irrevocable
unless some specific circumstance caused its termination."
2. Did the Bennett Family's Prescriptive Easement Terminate
Prior to the Shirley's Acquiring Title?
In South Carolina, there are generally seven ways in which an easement
may be terminated: (1) abandonment, (2) estoppel, (3) end of necessity, (4)
merger, (5) release, (6) expiration, and (7) prescription by the servient
tenement. Estoppel is irrelevant since there was no evidence of Mr. Bundy
detrimentally relying on assertions made by Mr. Shirley or his predecessors
in title." 7 End of necessity can only terminate an easement of necessity, not
a prescriptive easement." There is no evidence that the Bennett family or
any subsequent owner of Mr. Shirley's estate also owned Mr. Bundy's
servient estate such that merger would have applied.119 Although Mr.
Shirley, or one of his predecessors in title, could have expressly released his
claim to the easement, no such evidence was presented.120 An easement can
only terminate through expiration if it was created for a specific term or until
114. 12 S.C. JUR. Easements § 3.
115. See 12 S.C. JUR. Easements §29.
116. Id. ("[A]bsent termination due to circumstances such as abandonment, estoppel, end
of necessity, merger, release, or prescription by the servient tenement, an appurtenant
easement and an easement in gross of a commercial character are perpetual and irrevocable.").
117. See Bundy v. Shirley, 412 S.C. 292, 772 S.E.2d 163 (2015); Boyd v. BellSouthTel.
Tel. Co., 369 S.C. 410, 422, 633 S.E.2d 136, 142 (2006) ("The essential elements of equitable
estoppel as related to the party estopped are: (1) conduct which amounts to a false
representation or concealment of material facts, or, at least, which is calculated to convey the
impression that the facts are otherwise than, and inconsistent with, those which the party
subsequently attempts to assert; (2) intention, or at least expectation, that such conduct shall be
acted upon by the other party; and (3) knowledge, actual or constructive, of the real facts.").
118. Boyd, 369 S.C. at 422, 633 S.E.2d at 142 (citing GUSTAFSON, supra note 48, §§ 29,
35) ("An easement implied by prior use will not be extinguished if the easement is no longer
necessary, but an easement by necessity will not be extinguished once the necessity ends.").
119. See Bundy, 412 S.C. at 292, 772 S.E.2d at 163 (2015); see generally Pearce v.
McClenaghan, 39 S.C.L 178, 5 Rich. 178 (Ct. App. 1851).
120. See Bundy, 412 S.C. at 292, 772 S.E.2d at 163; Witt v. Poole, 182 S.C. 110, 188
S.E. 496, 498 (1936) (citing 19 C.J.S. Easements § 153) ("It seems to be settled that a cesser of
the use, coupled with any act clearly indicative of an intention to abandon the rights, will have
the same effect as an express release of the easement without any reference whatever to time,
which is not a necessary elements in the question of abandonment.").
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the happening of a particular event, but there is no evidence of such a limit
being placed on the disputed dirt road.121 Based on the facts provided in the
opinion, there are only two possible methods through which the easement
could have terminated during the period from 1969 to 1985: (1) prescription
by the owner of the servient estate or (2) abandonment.
a. What is Required to Establish Termination of an Easement
by Prescription by the Owner of the Servient Estate?
There appear to be only two South Carolina cases that address
termination of an easement by the prescriptive use of the servient estate
owner.122 Both of these cases rely on the adverse possession statute to assert
that ten years of adverse possession of the easement will act to terminate
it.123 Not insignificantly, this adverse possession previously required five
years of adverse possession in order to divest title.124 Recall that the court in
Bundy "question[ed] the propriety of Cuthbert because the case inexplicably
requires a five-year period of adverse and continued obstruction to defeat an
established prescriptive easement."125
While adverse possession and prescriptive easements are analagous in
many ways,126 key distinctions prevent the two concepts from being applied
interchangeably. As noted in Bundy, "adverse possession operates to divest
title to the land at issue whereas the rights of prescriptive easements in land
are measured by the use made of the land giving rise to the easement."127
Since the owner of the dominant estate does not hold title to the land over
121. See generally 12 S.C. JUR. Easements § 29 ("Any easement may, by the terms of
the express or implied grant, however, be made for a specific term only or be made terminable
upon a specific event.").
122. State v. Pettis, 41 S.C.L. 390, 7 Rich. 390 (Ct. App. 1854) ("[A]n easement,
founded either in express grant, or depending for its existence upon evidence of prescription,
may be lost or extinguished by a tortious interruption of its exercise by the owner of the soil
charged with such easement, provided such interruption be continued for a sufficient length of
time to legalize the right under the statute of limitations."); Bowen v. Team, 40 S.C.L. 298, 6
Rich. 298 (Ct. App. 1853) ("I hold that ten years adverse possession of land is a conveyance of
the fee resting in the owner thus barred, and that ten years adverse possession of an easement,
(a way,) by the owner of the soil, operates as a release to him of the right.").
123. State v. Pettis, 41 S.C.L 390, 7 Rich. 390 (Ct. App. 1854); 12 S.C. JUR. Easements
§ 33 (citing S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-67-210-260 (2012)) ("Prescription may be based on the
10-year adverse possession statute of limitations.").
124. Brock v. Kirkpatrick, 69 S.C. 231, 48 S.E. 72, 80 (1904) (quoting Turpin v.
Brannon, 14 S.C.L. 261, 3 McCord 261, 267 (Ct. App. 1825)).
125. Bundy, 412 S.C. at 312, 772 S.E.2d at 174.
126. 12 S.C. JUR. Easements § 10.
127. Bundy, 412 S.C. at 305, 772 S.E.2d at 170 (quoting GUSTAFSON, supra note 48,
§ 39).
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which the easement runs, any adverse possession on the part of owner of the
servient estate is futile because there is no title to divest.128 Therefore, to
terminate an easement by prescription by the owner of the servient estate,
"[the adverse use] must last for the prescriptive period, which is generally
the same period required for creating an easement by prescription."129
However, in South Carolina, Pettis,130 Bowen,131 and Cuthbertl32 all allow
for the shorter period required for adverse possession to apply in cases
involving termination by prescription. Although all of these cases are from
the nineteenth century, these cases represent the current standard in South
Carolina. Therefore, it appears that an easement may be terminated by ten
years of prescriptive use in South Carolina.133 Nationally, it appears that the
current majority approach is to require the same period of use to terminate
an easement through prescription as is required to acquire an easement
through prescription.134
Should South Carolina adopt the majority approach and require twenty
years of adverse use by the owner of the servient estate, it would be
impossible for the easement to have terminated by prescription during the
period from 1969 to 1985, which was only sixteen years. However, even
under the shorter ten-year requirement, as provided by the adverse
possession statute,135 there was still insufficient evidence to show a
termination by prescription. Since Mr. Bundy would be the one asserting
that the easement had terminated, he would have the burden of proving each
element of prescription during this period.136 However, the Bundy opinion
suggests that neither party presented any evidence relating to the use of the
128. See id.
129. BRUCE & ELY, supra note 31, § 10:25 ("An easement terminated by the servient
estate owner's adverse use or possession of the easement area for the period of prescription.");
see also RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROP.: PRESCRIPTION § 506 cmt. E (AM. LAW INST. 1944)
("The period of prescription for the extinguishment of an easement is the same as the period of
prescription fixed by local law for obtaining easements.").
130. State v. Pettis, 41 S.C.L. 390, 7 Rich. 390 (Ct. App. 1854).
131. Bowen v. Team, 40 S.C.L. 298, 6 Rich. 298 (Ct. App. 1853).
132. Cuthbert v. Lawton, 14 S.C.L. 194, 3 McCord 194 (Ct. App. 1825).
133. 12 S.C. JUR. Easements § 33 (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-67-210 (2012)).
134. See BRUCE & ELY, supra note 31, § 10:25; RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROP.:
PRESCRIPTION § 506 cmt. E (AM. LAW INST. 1944) ("The period of prescription fixed by local
law for obtaining easements.").
135. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-67-210 (2012).
136. Compare BRUCE & ELY, supra note 31, § 10:25 ("In order for an easement to be
extinguished by prescription, the servient owner's use or possession must satisfy the same
elements required for obtaining an easement by prescription."), with Morrow v. Dyches, 328
S.C. 522, 527, 492 S.E.2d 420, 423 (Ct. App. 1997) ("The party claiming a prescriptive
easement has the burden of proving all elements.").
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disputed road from 1969 to 1985.137 Therefore, without additional evidence,
it cannot be held that the easement erminated by prescription.
b. What is Required to Establish the Abandonment of an
Easement?
Similar to termination by prescription, "[t]he burden of proof is upon the
party asserting abandonment to show the abandonment by clear and
unequivocable evidence."'38 The determination of whether an easement has
been abandoned is "a factual question in an action at law." 3 9 This analysis is
centered on the intention of the owner of the easement to abandon.140
Further, "[t]he intention to abandon need not appear by express declaration,
but may be inferred from all of the facts and circumstances of the case."141
However, such an inference may only be made where, "the acts and conduct
of the owner and the nature and situation of the property, where there
appears some clear and unmistakable affirmative act or series of acts clearly
indicating, either a present intent to relinquish the easement, or purpose
inconsistent with its further existence."142
Within this context, South Carolina courts have repeatedly held, "[m]ere
nonuse of an easement created by deed will not amount to an
abandonment."143 However, the law in South Carolina appears unsettled
regarding whether nonuse alone is enough to constitute abandonment of an
easement hat was not created by a deed, such as a prescriptive easement.
Nationally, the general rule is that mere nonuse is not enough to constitute
abandonment, regardless of whether the easement was created by a deed or
137. Bundy v. Shirley, 412 S.C. 292, 313, 772 S.E.2d 163, 174 (2015).
138. Rhett v. Gray, 401 S.C. 478, 491, 736 S.E.2d 873, 880 (Ct. App. 2013) (quoting
Carolina Land Co. v. Bland, 265 S.C. 98, 109, 217 S.E.2d 16, 21 (1975)); see also Judy v.
Kennedy, 398 S.C. 471, 479, 728 S.E.2d 484, 488 (Ct. App. 2012) (providing that the burden
is a "high one").
139. Rhett, 401 S.C. at 491, 736 S.E.2d at 880 (quoting Eldridge v. City of Greenwood,
331 S.C. 398, 416, 503 S.E.2d 191, 200 (Ct. App. 1998)).
140. Id. (citing Carolina Land Co., 265 S.C. at 109, 217 S.E.2d at 21 (1975)).
141. Carolina Land Co., 265 S.C. at 109, 217 S.E.2d at 21.
142. Id. (citing Hodge v. Manning, 241 S.C. 142, 151, 127 S.E.2d 341, 345 (1962)).
143. Rhett, 401 S.C. at 491, 736 S.E.2d at 880 (citing Witt v. Poole, 182 S.C. 110, 115,
188 S.E. 496, 498 (1936)); see also Carolina Land Co., 265 S.C. at 109, 217 S.E.2d at 21
(citing Witt, 182 S.C. at 110, 188 S.E. at 496) ("[M]ere nonuse of an easement created by deed
for a period however long will not amount to an abandonment, but there must be other acts by
the owner of the dominant estate conclusively manifesting either the present intention to
relinquish the easement or purpose inconsistent with its further existence."); Judy, 398 S.C. at
479, 728 S.E.2d at 488 (citing Witt, 182 S.C. at 115, 188 S.E. at 499) ("That burden [of
proving abandonment] is a high one that cannot be satisfied by mere nonuse.").
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not.144 Many jurisdictions have provided an express exception for
prescriptive easements where nonuse for the period of prescription does
constitute an abandonment of the easement,145 while others have provided
that such a period of nonuse creates a rebuttable presumption of
abandonment.146
Although South Carolina has been identified as one of the states that
provides that nonuse of a prescriptive easement for the prescriptive period
constitutes abandonment, this is predicated solely on an 1848 case.147
Furthermore, in this 1848 case, the judge expressly provided that, "I am
unaware of any fixed time by the law, for supposing the abandonment of
such a right; although, by analogy, it may be supposed to be twenty years or
more."148 Although the judge in Parkins quoted a Massachusetts case that
provided that a period of nonuse for twenty years would create a
presumption that the easement was terminated, the judge immediately
provided that, "I would not venture therefore to fix any time for proving, by
a non-user, the abandonment of such an easement."149 Instead, the judge
provided that determination of whether an easement has been abandoned "is
a question of intention, for the jury."'1o By refusing to set a firm time period
in which nonuse can constitute abandonment and also suggesting that the
jury must always look at the intent of the easement holder, this case actually
appears to follow the majority approach that mere nonuse is not enough to
constitute abandonment.
In Bundy, the court provided that, "there is no evidence of the use of the
easement from 1969, when Mr. Shirley alleged the easement was perfected,
144. BRUCE & ELY, supra note 31, § 10:19 ("Nonuse of an easement, even for a
prolonged period, generally does not in and of itself amount to abandonment.").
145. Id; see, e.g., Andrews v. Hatten, 794 So. 2d 1184, 1188 (Ala. Civ. App. 2001);
Johnston v. Verboon, 598 S.W.2d 752, 754 (Ark. 1980); Chevy Chase Land Co. v. U.S., 733
A.2d 1055, 1082 n.8 (Md. 1999); McDonald v. Sargent, 13 N.W.2d 843, 844 (Mich. 1944);
Cronk v. Tait, 719 N.Y.S.2d 386, 387 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001); Shippy v. Hollopeter, 304
N.W.2d 118, 121 (S.D. 1981).
146. BRUCE & ELY, supra note 31, § 10:19; Sally Brown Richardson, Nonuse and
Easements: Creating A Pliability Regime of Private Eminent Domain, 78 TENN. L. REV. 1, n.
87 (2010) ("The jurisdictions that have adopted this exception include: Arizona, Arkansas,
California, Guam, Maine, Michigan, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Wisconsin.").
147. Jennifer L. Romeo, Loss ofPrivate Easements by Nonuse, 62 A.L.R. 5th 219 (1998)
(citing Parkins v. Dunham, 34 S.C.L. 224, 3 Strob 224, 228 (S.C. App. L. 1848)) ("The
following courts have applied the rule that an easement established by prescription is lost by
mere nonuse for the same period as was required to establish it, regardless of the easement
holder's intent."); Richardson, supra note 146, at n.87 (citing Parkins, 34 S.C.L. at 228).
148. Parkins, 34 S.C.L. at 228.
149. Id
150. Id
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and 1985, the time Mr. Shirley's parents purchased the property."'5' Even
assuming that South Carolina does follow the more lenient standard, where
mere nonuse for the prescriptive period is sufficient, there would still be
insufficient evidence to find abandonment. First, this period of unknown use
was only 16 years. No jurisdiction has held that nonuse for a period less than
the prescriptive period, without more, is sufficient to constitute
abandonment. Second, Mr. Bundy would bear the burden of showing
abandonment hrough clear and convincing evidence.152 Therefore, it is only
significant that Mr. Bundy presented no evidence regarding the use of the
disputed road from 1969 to 1985. Even if Mr. Bundy were able to present
evidence that definitively showed nonuse during this period, he would still
be tasked with presenting additional evidence of acts by the dominant estate
owner that either showed intent to abandon the easement or were
inconsistent with its continued existence.153
IV. CONCLUSION
Admittedly, the facts and evidence of Bundy are particularly unique. It is
rare that an owner of property will be unable to present any evidence
regarding the use of his property by his immediate predecessors in title. It is
even more unlikely that that same owner would be able to present extensive
evidence regarding the use of the property from the predecessor in title
whose ownership began fifty-eight years prior to the commencement of the
action. The situation was further complicated by Mr. Shirley's choice to rely
extensively on a sparse 1825 opinion.
However, relying on the traditional principles regarding easements helps
to sort through these unique complexities. By looking first at whether or not
the easement created was appurtenant or in gross and then determining if the
easement had terminated prior to Mr. Shirley obtaining title to the dominant
estate, it becomes apparent that Cuthbert started with the presumption that
an easement is perpetual and irrevocable and then held that the owner of the
servient estate may terminate this easement hrough adverse possession for
the statutory period at the time.
151. Bundy v. Shirley, 412 S.C. 292, 313, 772 S.E.2d 163, 174 (2015).
152. Rhett v. Gray, 401 S.C. 478, 491, 736 S.E.2d 873, 880 (Ct. App. 2013) (quoting
Carolina Land Co. v. Bland, 265 S.C. 98, 109, 217 S.E.2d 16, 21 (1975)). See also Judy v.
Kennedy, 398 S.C. 471, 479, 728 S.E.2d 484, 488 (Ct. App. 2012) (providing that this burden
is a "high one").
153. Carolina Land Co., 265 S.C. at 109, 217 S.E.2d at 21 (citing Hodge v. Manning,
241 S.C. 142, 151, 127 S.E.2d 341, 345 (1962)).
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Much of the blame likely lies with Mr. Shirley for basing his claim so
heavily on a single, seemingly outdated case. However, the unnecessary
creation of this additional continual use element has the potential to
significantly impact future individuals seeking to claim, or maintain their
claim to, a prescriptive easement. Although the exact facts of this case are
unlikely to arise again, the imposition of this continual use element places all
prescriptive easements, present and future, in a state of perpetual
uncertainty.
The elements of prescriptive easement have been carefully crafted over
centuries in order to balance these interests. Further, South Carolina already
provides additional protection to property owners from having their property
unnecessarily burdened by easements. While most jurisdictions presume that
an easement is appurtenant unless shown otherwise, South Carolina requires
that an easement satisfy all elements, including that it be essentially
necessary and have a terminus on the property.5 4 This standard applies
regardless of the intents of the parties.' Although the South Carolina courts
have recited that the courts prefer appurtenant easements, the stringent
adherence to these elements effectively shifts the preference in South
Carolina to easements in gross. Compared to jurisdictions nationally, South
Carolina appears to be the only state that has taken this step.1' It is
excessive to construct yet another substantial barrier preventing the transfer
or assignment of prescriptive easements.
"An easement established by prescription stands in all respects on the
same footing as an easement acquired by grant. Although some
jurisdictions have shown willingness to treat prescriptive easements as
slightly inferior by allowing nonuse for the prescriptive period to constitute
abandonment, such nonuse must still last for the entire prescriptive period.'
Although it is questionable whether South Carolina courts have been willing
to adopt this minor carve out, the continual use element essentially abrogates
this standard. Any period of nonuse, no matter how short it may be, will cut
off any subsequent claimants that seek to "tack" to an earlier use. Equally
significantly, the burden of refuting this nonuse is placed on the party
154. Sandy Island Corp. v. Ragsdale, 246 S.C. 414, 420, 143 S.E.2d 803, 806 (1965).
155. See, e.g., BRUCE & ELY, supra note 31, § 2:3 n. 12 (citing Tupper v. Dorchester
Cty, 326 S.C. 318, 326, 487 S.E.2d 187, 191 (1997)) ("In contrast [to the presumption that an
easement is appurtenant], the Supreme Court of South Carolina has taken the position that an
appurtenant easement must be "essentially necessary" to the enjoyment of a dominant estate,
and that an easement will be treated as one in gross unless this element can be shown.").
156. See id.
157. GUSTAFSON, supra note 48, § 35 (citing Nat'l Prop. Corp. v. Polk County, 386
N.W.2d 98 (Iowa 1986); Rutland v. Stewart, 630 So. 2d 996 (Miss. 1994).
158. BRUCE & ELY, supra note 31, § 10:19.
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claiming a right to the prescriptive easement. This is a complete reversal of
the long-settled rule that the party asserting that a termination has occurred
bears the burden of proof.159 This places far too great of a burden on the
owner of the dominant estate, who must always be prepared to account for
the continual use of the prescriptive easement, even after the use has been
continuous and uninterrupted for the prescriptive period.
The court's creative application of continual use and tacking simply
does not comply with the law regarding prescriptive easements in South
Carolina. Its holding has the potential to be much more harmful than the
court dropping a comma in the third element of prescriptive easements in
Steele.160 Rather than waiting decades while these new principles gain
traction, the holding should be expressly limited to the exact facts of the
Bundy case.
159. See, e.g., Rhett v. Gray, 401 S.C. 478, 491, 736 S.E.2d 873, 880 (Ct. App. 2013)
(citing Carolina Land Co. v. Bland, 265 S.C. 98, 109, 217 S.E.2d 16, 21 (1975)) ("The burden
of proof is upon the party asserting abandonment to show the abandonment by clear and
unequivocable evidence.").
160. Simmons v. Berkeley Elec. Coop., No. 2013-001477, 2016 WL 6520167, at *3
(citing Steele v. Williams, 204 S.C. 124, 133, 28 S.E.2d 644, 648 (1944)).
820 [VOL. 68: 795
26
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 68, Iss. 4 [], Art. 11
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol68/iss4/11
